The ability to represent same-different relations is an important condition for abstract thought. However, there is mixed evidence for when this ability develops, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. Apparent success in relational reasoning may be evidence for genuine conceptual understanding or may be the result of low-level, perceptual strategies. We introduce a method to discriminate these possibilities by pitting two conditions that are perceptually matched but conceptually different: in a ''fused" condition, same and different objects are joined, creating single objects that have the same perceptual features as the two object pairs in the ''relational" condition. However, the ''fused" objects do not provide evidence for the relation 'same.' Using this method with human toddlers in a causal relational reasoning task provides evidence for genuine conceptual understanding. This novel technique offers a simple manipulation that may be applied to a variety of existing match-to-sample procedures used to assess same-different reasoning to include in future research with non-human animals across species, as well as human infants.
Introduction
The ability to represent relations between objects and events is an essential condition for abstract thought; some have suggested that relational abilities may be the key to the cognitive differences between humans and other animals (Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008) . However, there is mixed evidence about when this ability develops, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. Traditionally, there was little evidence for relational reasoning in either young children or non-human animals. More recent results, particularly involving the foundational relations ''same" and ''different" challenge that conclusion. Ducklings can generalize these relations in an imprinting paradigm (Martinho & Kacelnik, 2016) . Human infants are able to generalize these relations in looking-time experiments. In particular, pre-verbal infants can be habituated to pairs of same and different objects (Addyman & Mareschal, 2010; Ferry, Hespos, & Gentner, 2015; Hochmann, Mody, & Carey, 2016; Tyrell, Stauffer, & Snowman, 1991) , discriminate and generalize patterns of repeated visual or auditory elements (ABA/AAB/ABB) (Dawson & Gerken, 2009; Johnson et al., 2009; Marcus, Vijayan, Bandi Rao, & Vishton, 1999; Saffran, Pollak, Seibel, & Shkolnik, 2007) , and provide a conditioned response to pairs of identical stimuli (Hochmann, 2010; Kovács, 2014) . Moreover, very young toddlers can apparently use same-different relations in an active causal learning paradigm (Walker & Gopnik, 2014) , although this ability declines in the preschool period (Walker, Bridgers, & Gopnik, 2016) . In these studies, toddlers, aged 18-30-months, were able to infer same-different relations in a causal version of a match to sample task (i.e., matching AA 0 with BB 0 , not CD, and matching EF with CD, not BB 0 ). On the other hand, it is possible that these successes may be mediated by perceptual factors that are quite separate from the abstract same-different concepts that these tasks are intended to assess (see Addyman & Mareschal, 2010 for a review). It is clear that both human and non-human animals are able to perceive the similarity of objects, agents, and events in their environment; these abilities are necessary for basic cognitive functions (Hochmann et al., 2016; Martinho & Kacelnik, 2016) . However, noticing similarity does not necessarily imply the existence of the conceptual representation, same. This distinction is difficult to make, and this point has been widely debated in the comparative literature (Penn et al., 2008; Thompson & Oden, 1996) .
For example, non-human primates (Wasserman, Fagot, & Young, 2001 ) and several species of birds (Pepperberg, 1987; Smirnova, Zorina, Obozova, & Wasserman, 2015) 
